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Background Sentence. 7 . that the State ought to investigate the deeds which generated the violations established in the present Sentence in order to identify and sanction the ones responsible for them. 8. that the State ought to facilitate the conditions for Baruch Ivcher Bronstein would be able recover the use and enjoyment of his rights as the majority owner of his Latin American Company as it was before August 1, 1997 according to the terms of the domestic legislation. Domestic law applies to the compensation pertaining to the dividends as the majority shareholder. For all of this, the respective requests ought to be submitted to the competent, national authorities. 9. The State ought to pay in equity Baruch Ivcher Bronstein an indemnization of $20,000.00 or its equivalent in Peruvian currency to effectuate the payment of moral damages. 10. In equity, the State ought to pay Baruch Ivcher Bronstein the sum of $50,000.00 U.S. dollars or its Peruvian equivalent to make him whole for the costs related to the domestic as well as international litigation. 11. The Court would supervise the execution of the Sentence until the closing of the case. On March 14th, 2001, the Court decided the following in regards to the Ivcher Bronstein case:
1. To Ivcher was struggling to regain his citizenship and his rights in the television station, President Alberto Fujimori, serving his second term, was endeavoring to overcome the limitations of Peru's 1993 Constitution, which prohibits a president from serving more than two consecutive terms. Fujimori's first term began in 1990, three years before the Constitution came into effect. In 1996, the Peruvian Congress enacted a statute that interpreted the term limitation as inapplicable to presidential terms that began prior to the approval of the Constitution. Three of the seven justices (with two abstentions) on Peru's Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitutional) invalidated the new statute, however, as it 'applied to the specific case of the incumbent President's candidacy for the office of President in the year 2000,' thereby threatening to frustrate Fujimori's ambitions for a third presidential term. Four months later, the Congress impeached the three justices and then voted in favor of removing them from the Constitutional Tribunal. Pursuant to a petition filed by a number of Peruvian congressional deputies, the Commission issued a report finding that Peru had violated the justices' rights to a fair trial, as well as the right of all Peruvians to an independent and impartial justice system. The Commission recommended that Peru reinstate the justices, but Peru failed to comply or to reach a friendly settlement after negotiations with the petitioners. The Commission then submitted the case to the Court." See also Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6. 19 nations under the jurisdiction of the Court. So the Court has prevailed through the one and a half outright challenges against it, both with Peru as well as Trinidad and Tobago. 22 As of yet, no one has assessed the general state of compliance to the IACHR. 23 This article aims to start filling this gap in the scholarly literature. It also seeks to provide some theoretical grounding to compliance with international law, why the Court has received the degree of compliance it has had, as well as theory based clues to how the Court might gain greater compliance and influence 24 -since its work plays a critical role in bringing greater justice to this hemisphere. 25 
Background and Foundation
A brief background of the Inter-American human rights system helps to set the stage for understanding the history, practice and procedure of the Inter-American court, which in turn gives context to the issue of compliance. 26 The Court was installed in Costa Rica through a series of acts starting from September 3, 1979 in the National Theater of San Jose. The National Theatre, appropriately enough, was the location where the American Convention (with which the Court is supposed to adjudicate) had been drafted close to a decade earlier.
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The Convention entered into force on July 18, 1978 when Grenada deposited its instrument of ratification to the Convention. Grenada acted as the pivotal eleventh member state of the OAS to do so. 28 On May 22, 1979, the States Parties to the Convention elected seven judges to serve as the original Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the sole judicial organ in the Inter-American human rights system. As such, it is the final arbiter of human rights in those American States that have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. As of January 2003, twenty-four of the thirtyfive Member States of the OAS are State Parties to the American Convention.
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During its early years, the Court's prospects for improving the human rights of the people of the Americas appeared uninspiring. Dictators in the Western Hemisphere perpetrated gross and systematic violations of human rights. State-sponsored forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and torture were commonplace. The court's principal vehicle for contributing to international law during that period was its advisory opinions. 30 "These states are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago, which had been a State Party, denounced the American Convention on 26 May 1998, effective 26 May 1999." PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2. 31 Id.
[Vol. 33:3 applications filed against them by designating agents, filing memoranda, and appearing and arguing at public hearings. To be sure, States often filed preliminary objections, many of which were frivolous; however, when the Court denied these objections, the states presented their defenses.
The reputation of the Inter-American Court increased as a result of the quality of its jurisprudence. 32 The status of the Court is reflected in the status of State witnesses who have appeared before it to defend State actions. For example, in The Baena Ricardo Case, in which 270 former State employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed from their jobs as a result of an ex post facto law, Guillermo Endara, the former president of Panama, and his vice-president testified before the Court. 33 in which 270 former State employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed from their jobs as a result of an ex post facto law, Guillermo Endara, the former president of Panama, and his vice-president testified before the Court. Eventually, some States accepted responsibility for the human rights violations before the Court reached a judgment--leaving only the issue of reparations to be decided. 34 The acceptance of international responsibility on the part of the State indirectly acknowledged that an Inter-American Court judgment attributing responsibility to a State for human rights violations would be taken seriously-both domestically and internationally. 35 State compliance with Court-ordered reparations has similarly moved forward. As the Court has no coercive mechanisms in and of itself to enforce judgments, some thought that States would simply ignore them and refuse to make Court-ordered reparations to the victims. Honduras, under the presidency of Carlos Roberto Reina, a former Inter-American Court judge, eventually paid the compensation ordered by the Court. Most other States have also paid pecuniary compensation ordered by the Court, although many have balked and delayed payment for extensive periods. Redress extends beyond compensation alone. The Court may also order the State to take actions or to desist from particular acts. When Peru complied with the Court's order to release from prison Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo, 36 a college professor, it marked a new level of State compliance. 37 Upon the Court's order, Peru also later released Cesti Hurtado from prison. 38 Subsequently, in certain cases when the Court has declared a domestic law or judgment to be in violation of the American Convention, States have amended the laws, 39 domestic courts have declared them unconstitutional, 40 or domestic court judgments have been annulled. 41 These developments exalt Inter-American human rights law to supranational stature.
There exists, however, another level of State compliance with Court orders not yet commonly observed in the Inter-American system. The Court, in almost every case, orders the State to investigate, prosecute and punish the individuals responsible for the human rights violations. These orders seldom find fulfillment. In most cases, impunity reigns, and the State power structure lacks the means or the will to bring the perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. Some day, if and when the States regularly follow Court orders to prosecute and punish the violators, the Court will have contributed substantially to the fall of impunity and to the specific and general deterrence of human rights violations in this hemisphere. 42 The initial apprehension that the member states would withdraw their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction or denounce the American Convention has not generally met with reality. Only one State, Trinidad and Tobago, has denounced the Convention and the Court's jurisdiction, but it later returned with reservations. 43 Peru, which had announced its intention to withdraw its 45 Some of the portions of this agreement have a direct or indirect impact on our topic at hand.
• Article 1 provides that the IACHR is "autonomous."
46
• Article 3 helps the Court to build a community of law.
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• Article 5 provides that the Court will enjoy the immunities and 46 This is important because such a body must ideally be independent of the type of political pressure that could distort its judgment. 47 It provides that the Court may enter into agreements of cooperation with law schools, bar associations, domestic courts, and research institutions dealing with human rights so that the Court can strengthen the principles of the Convention and the Court itself. Id. at 18. 48 Id. at 17. 49 Again, this independence is crucial for establishing the impartiality of the Court. This official acknowledgment of the importance of the Court, while possibly viewed as token, is nonetheless an official pronouncement by the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, the host country of the Court. Especially during this formative period of the Court, such an official endorsement by Costa Rica could only be seen as a boon towards greater recognition and legitimacy, which aid in compliance. Id. at 17. 50 Id. at 18-19.
Financial protection is also built into the agreement. Article 7 forbids taxes on the Court with the exception of charges for public utility services. It also bars the imposition of customs, duties or charges for official use by the Court. It specifically protects the Court's publications from any such customs, duties or charges. This Article prevents retaliatory charges from being placed on the Court. Economic pressure in these forms is thus forbidden by the agreement. In this way, the Court is protected from some illicit attempts at swaying or intimidating it by attacking its figurative pocketbook. Such a measure increases the Court's financial independence.
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Article 8 further protects the Court's pocketbook by permitting the Court to operate accounts in any currency, hold funds in a foreign currency, transfer funds between countries, and convert currency without financial controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind. This monetary authorization without the burden of financial controls, regulations or moratoria would be important, for example, when there are monetary reparations to handle. If these protections were not in place, a country ordered to pay reparations could impose regulations that would in effect circumvent the payment of the reparation. 52 In this same vein, any judicial or administrative process, according to Article 9, cannot touch the Court, its assets, income and other property. This immunity includes not being subject to domestic courts unless the IACHR expressly waives its immunity in a particular case. Article 9 thus gives the Court the liberty to judge without being judged itself by other courts.
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The Court also has what is known as a "total franking privilege." What this means is that the IACHR does not have to pay for postage on its mail. Furthermore, the Court enjoys favorable treatment of its official communications at the level of diplomatic missions as to the rates, taxes, press rates, and priorities for its communications. These Article 10 privileges come with insulation against censorship of its correspondence and other official communications of the Court. The Court may even use codes to relay messages secretly. These measures at once prevent interference with the Court's communications as well as help facilitate these communications. 54 After Article 10 begin Chapters III-IX, which largely deal with the privileges and immunities of the Court and those who appear before the Court. These privileges include the granting of travel documents such as visas or diplomatic passports. Also, the immunities and privileges for judges are grounded minimally in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 51 Id. at 19. 52 Id. at 17. 53 Id. 54 Id. at 20. Chapter XI, Article 28 provides that Costa Rica will continue to subsidize the Court annually in an amount not less than its initial grant, which is recorded in the Law of the General Budget of the Republic of Costa Rica. 63 These factors aspect of the adequacy of these international tribunal systems concerns the time it takes for the case to reach its conclusion. Assuming that the case is found admissible and the tribunal reaches the merits and damages award stage, the proceedings can last anywhere from two to ten years, depending on the case's complexity and the tribunal's interest in a particular case. The Inter-American system will generally take longer because of its lack of financial and staff resources and each case's two-stage process of going through both the Commission and Court. On the other hand, in addition to having more money and a larger staff, cases before the European Court do not have to go through a commission. The Inter-American system however, does have friendly dispute resolution mechanisms built into it that expedite the resolution of cases. Unfortunately, the European system no longer appears to have such a strong, friendly dispute resolution mechanism in place, as the old . 61 "The United Nations Human Rights Committee was established to monitor the implementation of the Covenant and the Protocols to the Covenant in the territory of States parties. It is composed of 18 independent experts who are persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights. The Committee convenes three times a year for sessions of three weeks' duration, normally in March at United Nations headquarters in New York and in July and November at the United Nations Office in Geneva." United Nations Human Rights Committee, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/a/introhrc.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
62 "The term 'international tribunal' is referenced in a number of United States statutes. From these statutory obligations, as interpreted, one can discern a workable definition for international tribunals as: an objective and impartial adjudicative body established by or with the imprimatur of two or more governments with the power to make a binding decision as to law or facts. This definition falls between the two extremes, rejecting a litmus test that excludes many international adjudicative bodies that do not meet certain artificial categories, but is not so broad as to embrace the whole panoply of potential candidate institutions." Roger P. While the IACHR has its own particular characteristics, it does draw significantly from the European bodies. 71 The IACHR derives some of its substance (in the American Convention 72 ) from the same stream that is found in Europe. 73 The IACHR even receives funding from the European Union 73 As regards regional human rights systems, "three systems are in existence today, one in Europe, one in the Americas, and the third, in Africa. The European system is the oldest of the three and is generally considered to be the most effective. [Vol. 33:3 the time" (emphasis omitted). 75 This assertion finds corroboration in a host of studies? 76 Andrew T. Guzman notes that, "for years international law scholarship generally assumed that nations tend to comply with international law." 77 Yet some scholars contrarily claim that noncompliance is common. Tragically, the assumption of compliance may most contradict the reality in the realm of international human rights. Despite the great increase in human rights instruments since World War II, noncompliance remains more common than one might expect. 78 In the IACHR, however, compliance (at least on some levels) has stayed the norm with noncompliance the exception.
The Managerial Model
The New Sovereignty, a crowning work by Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard Law School and former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, together with Antonia Handler Chayes, who served as former Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force, contend that a "managerial model" best accounts for compliance with international law within treaty regimes, 79 such as the one placing countries under the jurisdiction of the IACHR. 80 "According to the Chayes, treaty compliance also derives from the need to maintain one's status within a highly interrelated community of states." 81 The Chayes state, "[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public." 82 This is in contradistinction to the view that the looming threat of sanctions coerces countries to follow the treaty regime. This observation seems to fit well with the compliance in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights--because the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly has yet to administer sanctions upon any member state. 83 Thus, the threat of sanctions is apparently not a live threat, which makes it implausible as the impetus for compliance with the judgments of the IACHR.
Fairness and Legitimacy
New York University Law Professor Thomas Franck avers that the fairness of the international rules themselves constitutes the linchpin of compliance in his book Fairness in International Law and Institutions. 84 Franck speaks of nations bowing to international law even without the hatchet of formal enforcement over their heads in consideration of right process (legitimacy) and distributive justice.
85 These notions at their best tie into the foundational discussion that preceded this section. Much of Franck's own philosophical foundations can be found in his book, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990 (1995) . Scott identifies three factors that have an impact on judicial legitimacy. These factors are: 1) unanimity or near unanimity in decisions; 2) professional civility in opinions; 3) and continuity of the law over time. The IACHR often meets the unanimity or near unanimity in decisions factor, seems to be a model of professional civility and decorum, and is still relatively young, which does not allow extensive continuity of the law over time. 86 5) The work of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights powerfully illustrates the inter-penetration of international and domestic systems in at least several ways:
• the obligation of nations to change their laws to be in conformity with a judgment of the court; • the fact that those in the executive branches of domestic governments are often charged with carrying out the Court's ruling;
• that domestic judicial and investigatory bodies have been ordered by the Court to continue investigations or judicial proceedings;
• the judgments of the Court are sometimes reported on by domestic media channels. So the changes in the international scene in general are largely found in the Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American system of human rights providing the key example. This analysis helps to map the matrix of compliance.
Self-Interest
Some scholars try to root compliance in self-interest: "Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have rejected the notion that nations feel a sense of obligation to obey international law and have treated compliance as an ephemeral result of the convergence of a nation's interest with the tenets of the law." 103 The immediate financial cost of complying with the judgments would tend to cut against this view. However, the longer-term interests such as reputation, trade, and international relations could factor in favor of this view. Along these lines, Moore states that:
Respecting human rights tend to impose immediate costsrestraints on governments power or the costs of providing opportunities. Violating human rights provides, from the governments's perspective, the immediate benefits of unrestrained action, while risking future costs, such as stunted economic growth. Complying with human rights thus demonstrates a willingness to restrain present use of power for long-term benefits, while violating human rights preserves the full range of governments' power in the present at the expense of future gains.
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In this sense, Jo M. Pasqualucci refers to the informal effectiveness of the Inter-American Court in the sense that in repeated instances, referral of a case to the Court, or the Court's scheduling of a public hearing has brought about positive action within the state involved.
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A Comparison with Europe
For a comparative analysis, Mark W. Janis, who holds the William F. Starr Professorship at the University of Connecticut, writes about the effectiveness of the European system. 106 He breaks down his study of compliance into three categories: 1) judgments (and decisions), 2) legal rules, and 3) the legal system itself. 107 He surveys the literature in these categories with prodigious footnotes.
